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1. Introduction  
 
Social science is entering a golden age. A rise in effective interdisciplinarity, the 
explosive growth of available data and computational power to make that data useful, and an 
increasing realization that pressing social challenges require cooperation across disciplines, have 
all contributed to this opportune time. Figure 1 presents evidence from cross-citations of how 
interdisciplinary research is on the rise in some social sciences, although not uniformly.  The 
historically most inward-looking social science disciplines -- psychology and economics,  
according to the Figure 1 data -- have become more open to the idea that researchers in 
neighboring fields have important information and methods to contribute to their disciplines. 
This opening of disciplinary borders is akin to an increasing “trade” of methods, languages, and 
knowledge across fields. 
The application of economic language about trade begins with the premise that, like 
people and countries, each social science discipline has different “endowments” (e.g., historical 
mastery of tools and accumulated knowledge) and comparative advantage (e.g., anthropologists 
carefully study different parts of the world and economists develop formal models). Each 
discipline has a specialized view, and none can fully explain human nature on its own. 
Economics is endowed with a set of formal mathematical tools that all graduate students must 
master in order to make predictions based on optimization given preferences and beliefs, as well 
as an econometrics toolkit for testing theories and inferring causation. Psychology explores the 
rich web of cognitive and social mechanisms that generate individual beliefs and behaviors. 
Anthropology seeks to understand cultural differences using ethnographic observation, 
unearthing physical details of human development, and exploring mathematical models of co-
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evolution of culture and genes (among other approaches), hoping one model may effectively 
approximate all human behavior at once. Political science studies systems of government, voting, 
juries, law, and a range of other situations in which people make consequential decisions 
collectively. Finally, sociology investigates how the social world is created by and influences 
how people think, feel, and act.  
 
Figure 1: Changes in rates of imported citations from neighboring disciplines from 
1970 to 2015 for five social science disciplines. Imported citations are generally increasing 
over this period, with notable exceptions (e.g., anthropology is not importing more citations 
and is not being imported either). Note the differences in y-axis ranges too: these show that 
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political science and sociology import a lot, but psychology and economics do not. The authors 
used weighted citation rates to observe changes in citation rates from the five social sciences to 
each of the other four. Plots are 5-year moving averages. Source: Angrist et al. (2017). 
 
One of the challenges of interdisciplinary work is communication among researchers. 
Multiple fields may investigate the same behavior but be unable to communicate their methods 
in a manner digestible by all potential collaborators. Interdisciplinarity needs a common trade 
language across disciplines, a “lingua franca.” In a useful lingua franca, all disciplines adopt the 
‘best’ language from whichever discipline first described an idea or construct with language 
clear enough to be imported into a new discipline without much confusion. Working together to 
build a common vocabulary will enhance the efficiency of trade and collaboration.  
Prominent examples of lingua franca include rational choice theory from economics, 
human laboratory experimental methods from psychology, culture from anthropology, survey 
methods in political science, social networks from sociology, and tools for causal inference from 
all over. Another notable example is game theory. Created by mathematicians such as John 
Nash, this framework only flourished after the seminal 1944 book by the polymath John von 
Neumann and the economist Oskar Morgenstern. Game theory is a lingua franca for social 
sciences because its basic concepts--players, information, strategies--are defined broadly enough 
to potentially apply to genes, viruses, insects, animals, and organizations with shared values, 
including nation-states (Gintis, 2007). 
Most importantly, interdisciplinarity is necessary for solving complex multi-dimensional 
problems and creating innovations for better health, wealth, and well-being (Watts, 2017). Some 
of today’s most significant and fastest-growing problems, such as drug addiction, obesity, 
changes in political discourse, and climate change, cannot be understood or solved by one 
discipline alone. Instead, solving these issues will require an understanding of the institutional 
incentives, cultural norms, cognitive mechanisms, and social network effects that created and 
continue to heavily influence these phenomena. Interdisciplinary work has already helped make 
progress in fields, including poverty, health epidemics, and mental health.  
Drug trafficking is one such example of how an interdisciplinary approach can facilitate 
problem-solving. Magliocca et al. (2019) combined interdisciplinarity and new data to analyze 
international drug trafficking in Central America (Figure 2). The researchers tested an agent-
based model against a database of estimated illicit drug flows from 2000-2014. In their model, 
the agents were local suppliers, cartel networks, and interdiction organizations trying to intercept 
drugs from the traffickers. The traffickers were motivated by profit, including a priced-in 
interdiction risk premium. Interdiction agents were motivated to intercept drugs (and interdiction 
capacity increased based on past success). Agent-based models seek to derive complex, lifelike 
behavior that is “emergent” from interactions of simple agents, typically simulating behavior 
which is too complex to solve mathematically. The model is successful at capturing many of the 
underlying trends, across time and countries, in trafficking flow and interdiction. It reproduces 
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two effects known as the “balloon” effect (when trafficking spreads into new areas) and the 
“cockroach” effect (when trafficking routes become fragmented). 
 
 
Figure 2: Central America modeling domain (center) with an example simulated narco-
trafficking network consisting of inactive nodes (gray circles), active nodes (red circles), and 
trafficking routes between each active node (dashed lines). The most southern and northern 
nodes outside of the model domain represent supply (e.g., Colombia) and demanding nodes 
(e.g., Mexico), respectively. Around the periphery, comparisons of subnational cocaine 
shipment volumes (blue regions in the map) reported at the administrative level of departments 
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in the Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB) (red line) and median volumes simulated 
by model versions with (blue line) and without (black line) a Network Agent. Shaded regions 
represent the bounds of the second and third quartiles of simulated cocaine volumes. 
Departments were selected to include at least one location per country and on the basis of 
having at least 5 y of continuous observations reported in CCDB. Image and legend from 
(Magliocca et al., 2019). 
 
This study illustrates practice and promise in the  golden age in many ways. First, their 
team consists of nine co-authors from seven universities, one government organization, and a 
coauthor who remained anonymous to protect confidential sources (and perhaps to stay alive). 
Their affiliations span geography, politics, biology, and earth sciences. Second, their model 
includes a novel application of ideas from behavioral economics about learning (Camerer & Ho, 
1999) and salience (Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2012) of specific trafficking events. Third, 
their model can be used to analyze how different policies will hypothetically change trafficking, 
prices, and drug use. Of course, models like this are never perfect, but they are a starting point 
and can always be improved using new evidence and plausible extensions.  
In the next section, we present two more general “case studies” of successful 
interdisciplinarity-- behavioral economics and social network science. In both cases, 
interdisciplinary research led to the creation of new cross-disciplinary fields of inquiry built on 
the comparative advantages of contributing fields, inspiring a shared lingua franca, generating 
insights about human nature, and improving social outcomes. 
 
2. Case Study: Behavioral Economics 
 
            Behavioral economics is the first of our two examples of successful interdisciplinary 
enterprises (Thaler, 2015, 2018). Behavioral economics uses evidence and methods from other 
social sciences -- particularly psychology -- to analyze natural limits on human computation, 
willpower, and selfishness. These analyses make new predictions about natural field data, 
including how markets work and can make novel suggestions about policies to improve human 
welfare. 
Analyzing such limits was of interest because conventional rational choice theory 
assumes maximization of subjective values (“utilities”) and Bayesian integration of information, 
sometimes over a long-time horizon or accounting correctly for risks. Not all people are always 
that smart or patient.  
To be fair, rational choice theory was always intended to be useful, rather than realistic. 
The question behavioral economists tackled was whether theories assuming more realistic 
psychology could be precise and more useful. Thaler and others (Camerer, Loewenstein, & 
Rabin, 2004) used an “insider” approach. This insider approach took rational choice theory as a 
simple benchmark, identified empirical “anomalies” that could not be sensibly explained by that 
benchmark, and sought explanations which added extra ingredients sparingly, to explain the 
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anomalies and make new predictions. The first step was to begin with highly controlled 
laboratory experimental evidence (using hybrid methods from psychology and experimental 
economics) to convince skeptics and establish plausible alternative theories. Then we turned to 
make new predictions about field data. Alternative theories with a small number of added 
parameters were developed so that rational and behavioral predictions could be compared 
(DellaVigna, 2018). 
 
            Example #1: Loss aversion. 
 
In their influential prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992) proposed that 
outcomes were subjectively valued by their gains and losses relative to a reference point, 
analogous to how a single percept could be subjectively perceived -- or “framed”-- as one of two 
distinct things (such as the face-vase illusion). For example, people may estimate their longevity 
to be higher if they judge the chance that they would live to age 75, compared to when they 
judged the chance that they would die before age 75 (Payne, Sagara, Shu, Appelt, & Johnson, 
2013). 
Tversky and Kahneman also suggested that losses were disliked much more than equal-
sized gains, a phenomenon called “loss-aversion.” Loss-aversion is sometimes conveniently 
expressed by a single parameter, λ, the ratio of gain utilities to loss utilities (or to their marginal 
utilities), which is often measured to be around 1.9 (Figure 2b).  
Loss-aversion became part of explanations for many different phenomena in social 
science, such as (1) which kinds of financial risks people accept or dislike in lab experiments 
(Gneezy & Potters, 1997), (2) why stocks return so much more than bonds (Thaler & Benartzi, 
2004), and (3) why there is a gap between high prices demanded to sell goods and lower prices 
paid to buy the same goods, the “endowment effect” (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). 
Psychologists demonstrated how sadness and disgust change the endowment effect (Lerner, 
Small, & Loewenstein, 2004) and also suggested effects of cognitive sequencing (Johnson, 
Häubl, & Keinan, 2007) and attention (Bhatia & Golman, 2019; Yechiam & Hochman, 2013). 
Cognitive neuroscientists have found evidence for loss-aversion in neural circuitry (Tom, Fox, 
Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007), including dissociations between circuitry valuing gains and losses 
(Yacubian et al., 2006) and an unusual tolerance of losses in patients with amygdala damage (De 
Martino, Camerer, & Adolphs, 2010). Political scientists have posited loss-aversion as one 
reason why concessions in bargaining are difficult (McDermott, 2004) and have analyzed its 
theoretical effects on election outcomes (Alesina & Passarelli, 2019) and trade policy (Tovar, 
2009). Figure 2 illustrates estimates of loss-aversion along with applications from goal-setting at 
round numbers and “narrow bracketing” of local losses and gains that should, rationally, be 
added up. 
 Many behavioral economists have not been keenly interested in the evolutionary and 
cultural origins of phenomena like loss-aversion (an unfortunate omission, in our view). There is 
evidence that loss-aversion and endowment effects are present in monkeys (Lakshminaryanan, 
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Chen, & Santos, 2008) and great apes (Kanngiesser, Santos, Hood, & Call, 2011) -- though only 
for food and not for other valued goods (e.g., tools). Apicella, Azevedo, Christakis and Fowler 
(2014) also found an unusual lack of endowment effects among market-isolated Hadza villagers 
in Tanzania. These data indicate that loss-aversion is not as universal as thought, and show why a 
wider scope of new data is needed.  
 
 
Figure 2: Loss-Aversion. (a) The gain-loss utility function over money derived from group 
parameters estimated from risky choices (Baillon, Bleichrodt, & Spinu, 2018). (b) The 
empirical distribution of the loss-aversion parameter λ from a meta-analysis. The blue and red 
panels include 286 and 469 effects, respectively (unpublished author data). (c) The 
distribution of marathon finishing times, with over nine million data points (Allen, Dechow, 
Pope, & Wu, 2017). Note the peaks at round numbers. (d) Actual point values in each period, 
plotted against optimal conditional point values from consumption choices, in a 50-period 
savings experiment (Brown, Chua, & Camerer, 2009). Note how few actual point values are 
negative even when optimal point values should be negative. This indicates that most subjects 
do not like to make choices that generate individual-period losses (“narrow bracketing”), even 
though performance is determined by the sum of all 50 periods.  
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Loss-aversion contributes to a “status quo bias,” the exaggerated tendency to choose a 
suggested default (or a previous status quo) when other choices are readily available (Samuelson 
& Zeckhauser, 1988). Countries in which organ donation is the default have much higher rates of 
donation than those in which it is not the default, even though the choice is simple to make 
(Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). The first impactful application of status quo bias is the “Save More 
Tomorrow” (SMART) plan (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). In this plan, companies auto-enroll 
workers into tax-advantaged 401(k) plans and invest a fraction of their next pay raise into the 
plan (so their paycheck does not go down and creates a subjective loss). These plans have 
increased savings substantially, with no apparent reduction in savings from other sources 
(Chetty, Friedman, Leth-Petersen, Nielsen, & Olsen, 2014). The SMART plan became a poster 
child for many types of “nudges,” designed choices that help some people make better decisions 
than they are likely to make on their own (Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & 
Rabin, 2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). 
 
 
Example #2:  Social preferences    
  
Humans are the most prosocial species--helping unrelated others at a cost to ourselves--
and we alsoe create large-scale institutions to facilitate such prosocial behavior. Cutting across 
social sciences is the question of how to express this prosociality mathematically, and what data 
to collect. Behavioral economics contributed both theories and a menu of economic choices and 
games.  
Of course, prosociality has long been contemplated in all social sciences, as well as in 
biology, moral philosophy, literature, and beyond. In economics, Adam Smith discussed “moral 
sentiments” and “fellow-feeling” (Smith, 1759). In 1881, Edgeworth included a “coefficient of 
effective sympathy”--the weight one person places on the utility of another--to try to make 
bargaining theory more precise (Edgeworth, 1881). That simple formulation and other variants 
(Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989) are still used today. In the 1960s, social 
psychologists began to describe social value orientations in the style of psychometrics (Messick 
& McClintock, 1968) and distinguished importantly between equal outcomes and equitable ones, 
reflecting differences in need or inputs (Messick & Cook, 1983).  
Game theory offers canonical strategic interactions that can be used to dissect elements of 
prosociality. A famous example is the “ultimatum game” (Camerer, 2003; Güth, Schmittberger, 
& Schwarze, 1982). In this game, a proposer offers a share of a known amount of resources, such 
as  $10, to a responder. The responder can accept the offer, in which case bargaining ends and 
they collect their money, or the responder can reject it, and then they both get zero. Games like 
this can measure whether and why people will reject money and whether the proposer correctly 
anticipates rejection.  
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Rejecting a low ultimatum offer is now thought to show negative reciprocity--a 
willingness to sacrifice resources to harm another person who has been unfair (relative to a social 
norm, often with cultural content). This tendency is even evident at the collective level. For 
example, police effectively solve fewer criminal cases after losing a wage arbitration (Mas, 
2006).  
As the ultimatum game caught on across social sciences, other fascinating games quickly 
followed, each with a natural interpretation about psychological motives  (Camerer & Fehr, 
2004): (1) dictator allocations, in which the responder must accept the offer (measuring altruism 
and norm-sensitivity); (2) trust games, in which a first-mover invests money, with a social risk to 
potentially benefit both parties, gambling that the second-mover will share the total gain (Berg, 
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Camerer & Weigelt, 1988); and (3) many-person gift-exchange 
labor markets in which firms prepay wages and hope that workers exert costly effort which 
benefits the firms and repays their trust (DellaVigna & Pope, 2018; Ernst Fehr, Kirchsteiger, & 
Riedl, 1993). 
Anthropologists also adopted these games. An interdisciplinary team, including 
anthropologists and behavioral economists, used economic games to study cross-cultural 
sociality in small-scale societies (Henrich et al., 2005, 2010). They learned that stronger sharing 
norms (which were punished by ultimatum rejections) were associated with societal cooperation, 
such as, building houses together, and with the extent of market trading. 
As interest in these games grew, the sociological lingua franca of a “norm” got imported 
into other social sciences. Norms are informal social rules that are expected to be followed, and 
usually informally self-enforced by social punishment for deviations (even absent legal 
enforcement). In dictator allocation games, for example, people have different subjective norms 
about what is fair to share. Their sharing of actual money is closely tied to their norm perceptions 
(Krupka & Weber, 2009). Thus, sharing money seems to reflect “manners” consistent with 
perceived norms rather than altruism per se (Camerer & Thaler, 1995). 
Cognitive neuroscientists have also used these games to measure social preferences, 
identify circuitry implementing prosociality (Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer, & O’Doherty, 2010), 
associate brain lesions with abnormal social preference (Krajbich, Adolphs, Tranel, Denburg, & 
Camerer, 2009), and linking to individual differences in neurotypical populations more generally 
(Bruhin, Fehr, & Schunk, 2019). 
 
Knowing more about social preferences has not contributed immediately to solving social 
problems at the scale that “nudging” has. However, experiments have suggested social forces 
that could enhance prosociality. For example, allowing people to punish others who have 
behaved antisocially seems to increase cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Yamagishi, 1986), 
although the results vary culturally (Herrmann, Thoni, & Gächter, 2008). New evidence has also 
invigorated understanding of charitable giving (DellaVigna, List, & Malmendier, 2012). In the 
future, diagnostic tools will likely emerge from a better understanding of sociality, with 
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applications ranging from psychiatry, methods to develop empathy, and people analytics 
enhancing the matching of workers with jobs.   
Summary:  
 
Progress in understanding loss-aversion and social preferences in behavioral economics 
(and many intellectually neighboring fields) are two example illustrations of how 
interdisciplinarity and better measurement create progress and even help solve problems, in our 
golden age. The simple idea of loss-aversion came from perceptual psychology and compelling 
early data. There was substantial hostility to the idea of loss-aversion in mainstream economics 
for many years. The idea that people have preferences over what others get, familiar within 
social psychology, was less controversial, but there is still debate about the best general theory.  
In general, behavioral economists won over skeptics by weaponizing the mantra that ‘the 
easiest way to win an argument is to run another experiment or another statistical regression’ 
(Thaler, 2018). In many areas of behavioral economics and finance, large data sets played an 
important role, including more recently, multi-site lab and field experiments (Cohn, Maréchal, 
Tannenbaum, & Zünd, 2019; Herrmann et al. 2008). A treasure trove of experimental data came 
about as nudges and other ideas were implemented by “behavioral insight teams” in firms, and 
governments on every continent, currently just over 200, according to the OECD (“Behavioural 
insights—OECD,” n.d.) to create better outcomes for citizens and consumers (Halpern 2015).      
As noted in discussing loss-aversion above, there has been limited interest of many 
behavioral economists  in the deeper biological and cultural origins of preferences, norms, and 
cognitive limits. Such data and models are necessary to generalize ideas beyond activity in 
developed societies that are “WEIRD” (Henrich et al., 2005) and not representative of all human 
activity. How preferences are formed and changed is also central to essential discussions about 
the value of economic institutions, like market development (Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012). 
 
3. Case Study: Social Networks 
 
Social networks are our second example of successful interdisciplinary enterprises. Network 
analysis uses methods from physics, computer science, and applied math to analyze questions 
often studied by sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists regarding how interpersonal 
relationships are formed and how behaviors, beliefs, and emotions are transmitted across 
connected individuals (Watts & Dodds, 2007). One striking feature of network analysis is the 
diversity of scholars contributing to intellectual progress. People from different fields, traditions, 
and countries have worked together on related questions (Freeman, 2004). Network analysis has 
been significantly enabled by the availability of novel datasets, such as social media connections 
as well as increasingly “connected” devices, such as fitness trackers with social aspects (Aral & 
Nicolaides, 2017; Coviello et al., 2014; Phan & Airoldi, 2015). 
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The recent history of network analysis owes a lot to Watts & Strogatz (1998), who highlighted 
several key network properties, including that real networks are neither totally ordered nor 
random. However, it turned out that simple mathematical models could capture features of 
complex networks, and those models could be applied to network dynamics across a variety of 
phenomena. It turns out that the seemingly unrelated affiliations between actors, power grid 
transmission lines, and the neural network of C. elegans could all be captured via a simple 
“small-world” network model, a mathematical graph in which the nodes (individuals) are not 
neighbors with most of the other nodes, and yet all other nodes can be reached in a small number 
of steps (limited degrees of freedom connecting individuals) (Christakis & Fowler, 2011; 
Jackson, 2019; Watts, 2003, 2004).  
  
 
  
 
Figure 3: (a) A network of human traffic reveals cities that are important nodes (in 
yellow) and effective borders (in red) (Thiemann, Theis, Grady, Brune, & Brockmann, 2010). 
(b) A network of international financial institutions. Edges symbolize mutual share-holdings 
(Schweitzer et al., 2009). Note the high connectivity among nodes that can create systemic risk 
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and network vulnerability. (c) Effects of the distribution of sexual partner concurrency  on 
network connectivity (adapted from Morris, Goodreau, & Moody, 2008). Note how a slight 
increase in average concurrent partners (from the top left to right histograms) dramatically 
impacts the number of nodes in the largest component of the network. (d) A network of brain 
regions where edges represent developmental increases in streamline density (Baker et al., 
2015).  
 
 
Example #1: Spread of Infectious Disease   
  
Sociologists have been integral to guiding the development of these network models, given how 
ubiquitously they can help explain the spread of anything from disease to innovation (Davis & 
Greve, 1997). Most infectious diseases spread through human contact, making the study of 
infection a natural place to apply network analysis. One of the first and longest-used models of 
disease spread, known as the SIR model, was introduced by Kermack & McKendrick (1927) and 
included some highly oversimplified assumptions, including that individuals of different classes 
(i.e., infected vs. susceptible) connected exclusively in pairs, and that those connections occurred 
randomly.   
  
As recounted by Martina Morris, it was feedback from a man in Uganda which illuminated the 
severe limitation of a model unable to handle multiple connections (multiple sexual partners) at 
once – something which is still closer to the norm than the exception in several societies 
(Kretzschmar & Morris, 1996). This insight led Morris and collaborators to create better models, 
ones which more accurately explained how the AIDS epidemic was spreading – specifically, 
how small variations in concurrency (simultaneous sexual partners) could have dramatic effects 
on a population’s vulnerability to HIV (Morris & Kretzschmar, 1997). 
  
It is unclear whether concurrency explains the full story, given that empirically it does not 
explain why places with high rates of concurrency do not necessarily have high rates of HIV and 
vice versa. One response to this is the potential misreporting regarding sexual activity, a private 
matter that complicates accurate data collection. Morris’s team continues to collaborate across 
disciplines (with sociologists and statisticians – she is a professor of both), as well as across 
geographies (with several collaborators in Africa), to refine and improve models of the spread of 
infection, and apply them to new and better datasets. 
  
Example #2: Revisiting Influence and Information Transmission 
  
Several social science disciplines, from anthropology to political science, are particularly 
interested in collective decision making. While often studied at a static point in time, implicitly 
assuming that all individuals simultaneously make independent decisions, the heterogeneous 
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process of information accumulation and integration prior to decision making suggests that 
decisions are actually made sequentially and that beliefs can be similarly “transmitted” from one 
individual to the next. The field of cultural evolution has been modeling information 
transmission for several decades, using both epidemiological and social network models in their 
approach (Richerson & Boyd, 1989).  
 
Broadly, social contagion models allow simulating the speed at which individuals receive 
information and how past interactions influence their behavior (Watts & Dodds, 2007). These 
models focus on a handful of key parameters, which can be grouped as: (1) degree centrality, (2) 
eigenvector centrality, (3) diffusion centrality, and (4) bridging (Jackson, 2019). While one 
might not wish to be central in an HIV infection network, centrality is viewed as an advantage in 
most social networks and is correlated with financial success (Burt & Ronchi, 2007) and well-
being (Morelli, Ong, Makati, Jackson, & Zaki, 2017). Degree centrality captures “popularity,” 
the sheer number of connections an individual might have, capturing the speed at which these 
individuals can easily transmit information to a wide group at once. Eigenvector centrality, 
which captures how many well-connected others one is connected to, has been used to study 
social status and scapegoats (Weaverdyck & Parkinson, 2018). Diffusion centrality is a measure 
of “reach,” capturing how well-positioned an individual is to spread and hear about information. 
Finally, bridging captures “social chameleons” who connect otherwise disparate groups. 
Interestingly, all of these positions appear to be context general: if an individual is central in one 
network, they are likely to be central in another, and so forth (Jackson, 2019). 
 
Network analysis has therefore allowed researchers to apply new tools while revisiting old 
questions about social influence. For example, researchers have investigated whom individuals 
gravitate to in a network, finding that empathetic people are chosen for situations which require 
trust and support, while positive people are chosen for situations that are fun and exciting 
(Morelli et al., 2017).  Other work has found that people give less money to those who are more 
socially distant (unknown) friends of friends in standard economic games (Candelo, Eckel, & 
Johnson, 2018; Goeree, McConnell, Mitchell, Tromp, & Yariv, 2010). Computational modeling 
methods have also been used to show that there is quicker consolidation of majority opinion and 
more successful spread of initially unpopular beliefs in populations characterized by their greater 
susceptibility to social influence (Muthukrishna & Schaller, 2019). 
  
Given how many behaviors – from smoking to divorce – are “contagious” across individuals, the 
dynamics of such contagion are of immense interest to social scientists and non-social scientists 
alike. 
 
Summary: 
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Network science would have been less successful without scientists from different disciplines 
borrowing ideas and communicating in a shared language about constructs and methods. To take 
a meta-perspective, innovation in network science has benefited from the wide network of 
researchers who share a lingua franca, can transmit high fidelity information, and bring a 
diversity of perspectives to the table (Muthukrishna & Henrich 2016).  
 
Networks and their properties are fundamentally interesting because they underpin such a wide 
range of phenomena. Unlike behavioral economics, there was less conflict among those studying 
networks because the concept of a network was so obviously appealing and useful from the start 
(i.e., there was no interdisciplinary conflict about whether people “were networked” as occurred 
about whether people “were rational”). Furthermore, while sociologists studied networks first, 
the difficult question of what networks arise when people have scarce social bandwidth and can 
choose network links was cracked by economists (Jackson & Wolinsky, 1996). Moreover, the 
increasing availability of large, novel datasets that capture connections between individuals, such 
as social media and online communication data, has truly turbo-charged network science.  
 
4. Spotlight on Studies  
 
Table 1 displays twelve studies that epitomize the golden age of social science research 
(Salganik, 2018). Each of these papers is an excellent example of one or more of these features: 
(1) collaborating in an interdisciplinary team; (2) using new types of data;  and (3) answering 
important and difficult questions. The table also demonstrates a wide variety of research topics, 
from exercise habits and social inequality to political preferences; and a diversity of datasets, 
including genetics, brain imaging, and browsing history. One notable study using CCTV footage 
tests the long-lived belief from early social psychology experiments that bystanders do not 
intervene to help strangers if there are other bystanders around (they actually do).  
 
Summary Subfield(s)* Main Novelty Reference 
Evolutionary changes 
in hominins created a 
niche that favored 
individuals with the 
ability to 
communicate and 
persuade, 
transforming 
sociopolitical life. 
Anthropology, 
Political Science 
Interdisciplinarity (Gintis, van Schaik, 
& Boehm, 2015) 
Greater exposure to 
war increases 
Anthropology, 
Biology, Economics 
Interdisciplinarity (Henrich, Bauer, 
Cassar, Chytilová, & 
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religiosity. Purzycki, 2019) 
Rwandans use the 
mobile phone 
network to transfer 
“mobile money” to 
those affected by 
unexpected economic 
shocks. 
Economics New type of data: 
mobile phone usage 
(Blumenstock, 
Fafchamps, & Eagle, 
2011) 
Describing the 
barriers to 
understanding the 
impact of AI on the 
labor market. 
Economics Interdisciplinarity (Frank et al., 2019) 
Railroad expansion 
from 1870 to 1890 in 
the U.S. increased 
agricultural land 
value. 
Economic History New type of data:  
geographic 
information system 
network database 
(Donaldson & 
Hornbeck, 2016) 
Brain responses to 
emotionally evocative 
images predict 
political ideology. 
Political Science, 
Neuroscience, 
Psychiatry 
Interdisciplinarity, 
new type of data: 
fMRI 
(Ahn et al., 2014) 
Genetic data can 
predict economic and 
political preferences. 
Political Science, 
Economics, 
Psychology, 
Sociology 
Interdisciplinarity, 
new type of data: 
GWAS 
(Benjamin et al., 
2012) 
Musical preferences 
and personality traits 
are linked. 
Psychology, 
Marketing 
New type of data: 
Facebook likes 
(Nave et al., 2018) 
Bystanders will help 
in public conflict. 
Psychology, 
Sociology 
Interdisciplinarity, 
new type of data: 
CCTV footage  
(Philpot, Liebst, 
Levine, Bernasco, & 
Lindegaard, 2019) 
Social networks 
strongly influence 
exercise habits. 
Sociology New type of data: 
fitness tracking 
(Aral & Nicolaides, 
2017) 
Fatal shootings of 
police officers 
increases police 
Sociology New type of data: 
NYC stop-and-frisk 
reports 
(Legewie, 2016) 
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violence towards 
black suspects. 
Estimating social, 
environmental, and 
health inequalities 
with neural networks 
and street images. 
Sociology, 
Economics 
New type of data: 
street images 
(Suel, Polak, Bennett, 
& Ezzati, 2019) 
 
*As much as we admire those who cross disciplinary boundaries, making it difficult to identify 
home fields, authors’ departmental affiliations are used here as a heuristic description.   
 
5. Conclusion and Challenges 
 
Interdisciplinary research inevitably presents new challenges. The following obstacles are worth 
noting given they disproportionately concern teams working on questions that cut across 
disciplines. It is advised that interdisciplinary research teams discuss and plan for dealing with 
these challenges before the research work begins: 
  
·      The question of informatics, or where and how information is accumulated, can be 
a special challenge for teams who are used to contributing to traditionally disparate 
disciplines. Many journals cater to the readership of a specific discipline or discipline 
subfield, with authors citing papers predominantly from like-minded journals. While 
cross-citation is on the rise, it is not guaranteed that interdisciplinary work will make 
equal contributions across fields, presenting the possibility of losing valuable insight 
with relevance to one of the fields.  
·      Closely tied to informatics is the question of incentives and authorship. 
Academics are often encouraged to remain focused on contributing to their respective 
subject areas, which means working with other academics in the same subfield and 
publishing in a specialized set of journals. While often practical and well-meaning 
advice, it constrains people to narrow paths with little upside to taking on 
interdisciplinary ventures. Furthermore, differences in authorship norms across 
disciplines (such as the strong emphasis on solo-authored papers in economics) make 
young researchers reluctant to join projects where a bigger team size is necessary in 
order to capture the range of specialized contributions necessary to tackle big research 
questions. If interdisciplinary work is to take off truly, research which makes 
contributions to other fields cannot be discounted, and papers with multiple co-authors 
should not automatically be seen as a smaller contribution than single-authored work.   
·      Interdisciplinarity possesses unique challenges for “open science”-- i.e., the sharing 
of procedures, data, and code intended to make research more widely accessible-- 
because different social science disciplines often have different tools and norms. As 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3486314 
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Stodden et al. (2016) note, “Current reporting methods are often uneven, incomplete, and 
still evolving.” However, this challenge is now widely recognized, and efforts are 
underway to improve open science in practice. 
·      As mentioned in the introduction, interdisciplinary teams tend to work on big 
questions, applying a range of tools and insights to solve important, complex problems. 
A characteristic feature of these problems is their tendency to bring up novel concerns 
regarding individual privacy and ethics. New types of data – from genetics to real-time 
biofeedback – carry potentially sensitive information. Sensors have great promise for 
changing behavior and mitigating risk as a real-time physical nudge. However, they also 
present ethical quandaries, such as what happens if the sensors make a mistake or the 
nudge is overridden. Scientists take experimentation and transparency for granted, but 
the average citizen is more skeptical (Meyer et al., 2019). Interdisciplinary teams across 
social science should seek ethicists and legal scholars to join the conversation.   
·      Another challenge is the creation of unifying frameworks to explain behaviors 
across disciplines. Better theories will restrain the number of explanations that could be 
derived from big data by setting appropriate priors for hypotheses (Muthukrishna & 
Henrich, 2019). An expansion of methodological approaches alone will not increase 
scientific knowledge unless there is common lingua franca or, even better, genuinely 
unifying frameworks.  Akin to the construction of modern biology from unifying 
principles in chemistry and physics, social science would benefit from evolutionarily 
plausible theories that provide ultimate (function) and proximate (mechanism) 
explanations. (Gintis, 2007) makes an argument that game theory is one promising 
candidate for unification.  
 
The challenges of informatics, incentives, open science, ethics, and theoretical unification 
are serious. However, the same interdisciplinarity, creation of institutions, and reliance on better 
and more extensive data that make for our golden age should help solve these challenges too. 
Furthermore, there is reason to be optimistic: our increasingly connected age means that 
knowledge from other disciplines is much easier to access. Cross-disciplinary citations no longer 
require walking between libraries to find journals siloed in between the literal four walls of their 
own field!  
 It is foolish, of course, to forecast both a number and a time at which problems like the 
worldwide rise of obesity or “fake news”  will be reined in. However, it is safe to say that our 
golden age will be marked by faster rates of progress in producing breakthrough social science 
and solutions to such human suffering than ever before. 
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